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A B S T R A C T
This article examines EU citizen attitudes to Turkey’s bid to
join the EU. The key theoretical constructs investigated to
explain opposition to Turkey’s EU membership are related
to rational economic self-interest and group-level interests
and concerns. The findings indicate that the former are
irrelevant for distinguishing between opponents and
supporters of Turkey’s candidacy, while the latter do provide
fairly powerful explanations for opposition to Turkish EU
membership. However, because these factors do not
completely explain overall levels of hostility to Turkey’s
candidacy, context is also introduced, particularly the
threatening context provided by Turkish migration. The find-
ings indicate that migration from Turkey to some of the EU
member states has combined with feelings of group pro-
tectiveness to produce widespread animosity to Turkey’s
entry into the EU.
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Turkish entry into the European Union (EU) is a highly contentious issue. As
the country continues to make political and economic reforms in the hopes
of being granted a definite entry date, it appears quite possible that the
country’s admission into the EU could be halted by EU citizens, regardless
of what decision their leaders reach with respect to Turkey’s membership.
The French debate surrounding the (failed) referendum on the European
Constitution, in which some of the public argued that the referendum could
be used as a vote against Turkey’s candidacy, is only one indication of the
virulence of opinion regarding this particular candidacy. As with many
important EU policy decisions (e.g. those outlined in the Constitutional Treaty
and the Treaty on European Union), it is possible that EU citizens themselves
will make the final decision on whether Turkey is allowed to join the EU.
Because of the high degree of citizen relevance to this particular decision, it
is important that mass opinion regarding the Turkish candidacy is analysed.
This is the purpose of this article.
Turkey first became affiliated with the EU in 1963 after signing an
associate membership agreement with the then European Community (EC).
Although the country might have taken the opportunity to apply for full EC
membership at the same time that Greece applied in 1975, its leaders failed
to do so, citing the need to develop further economically before gaining full
entry to the EU (Eralp, 1993; Müftüler-Baç, 1997). It was not until the EC was
in the midst of an already difficult Southern Enlargement that Turkey lodged
its application for full EC membership (in 1987). This is also the first point at
which we gain some indication of the feelings of the European mass public
on the issue of Turkey joining the EU. Shortly before the Turkish application
was lodged, a Eurobarometer poll conducted in the Spring of 1986 asked
respondents the following: ‘Supposing Turkey asked to be admitted as a
member country of the European Community (Common Market). What
would be your opinion?’ Even at this early stage, support was not over-
whelming: approximately 20% of EC citizens were favourable to this idea and
about 30% were opposed; the rest of the public was indifferent. In what might
now be seen as a sign of things to come, France displayed the greatest oppo-
sition, after Greece, to the idea of Turkey joining the EU. Still, slightly less
than 50% in France and exactly 50% in Greece were opposed. Since the late
1990s, overall opposition to Turkey’s candidacy has remained close to 50%
(for instance, opposition was at 47% in the autumn of 1999 and 49% in the
autumn of 2002). Table 1 indicates that, in comparison with other countries
that were official candidates for EU membership prior to 2004, opposition to
Turkey’s candidacy has consistently been the strongest. Table 2 provides
levels of opposition to Turkey’s candidacy by EU member state, and indicates
that there are vast differences across EU member states regarding feelings
about Turkey’s candidacy.
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Table 1 Opposition to EU candidacies (%)
1999 2000 2001 2002
Malta 26.5 28.0 28.0 29.0
Hungary 31.0 31.5 30.0 30.5
Cyprus 33.0 33.5 33.0 33.5
Poland 34.5 35.0 34.0 34.5
Czech Republic 35.0 35.5 34.0 34.0
Estonia 38.0 38.0 38.0 37.0
Latvia 38.0 38.0 38.0 37.5
Slovakia 38.5 38.5 38.0 37.5
Lithuania 39.0 38.5 38.0 37.5
Bulgaria 39.5 40.5 40.0 40.0
Slovenia 41.5 40.5 40.0 40.0
Romania 42.5 43.5 43.0 44.0
Turkey 47.0 47.5 46.0 48.0
Notes: All percentages are from Eurobarometer surveys (EB 51–58); other than 2001, all
percentages are an average across two surveys conducted in the same year. Note that the
differences in percentages between any two semi-annual surveys is minimal, however.
Table 2 Opposition to Turkish candidacy by member state (%)
% Opposed N
Spain 23 964
Ireland 26 967
Portugal 30 920
United Kingdom 35 1217
Italy 45 959
Sweden 46 949
EU average 47 14,750
Netherlands 49 838
Greece 51 951
Denmark 52 944
Germany 55 1904
Belgium 56 942
France 56 878
Finland 57 949
Austria 63 898
Luxembourg 66 470
Note: The percentages are based on Eurobarometer 53 (Spring 2000), the survey to be used for
most of the analyses in this article; note that the percentages change very little for each of the
member states across the 1999–02 period.
The purpose of this article is to explain contemporary hostility to
Turkey’s EU membership amongst citizens of the EU. In developing possible
explanations for variation in this hostility, it turns to theoretical propositions
that have their roots in rational self-interest and group interest. The article
also incorporates analyses of attitudes toward other candidacies in order to
determine the degree to which the explanations investigated account for
opposition to Turkish membership in particular. The question posed at this
stage of the analysis is: do our chosen explanations for this hostility provide
any explanation for why EU citizens feel so strongly about Turkey? The
findings indicate that – somewhat surprisingly – they do not uniquely
explain hostility to the Turkish candidacy. Therefore, the role of national
context is introduced as a possible explanation for negative reactions to
Turkish EU membership. The general argument is that, although group
interests and fears related to threats to these interests provide some under-
standing of hostility to Turkey, these explanations are also valid in 
understanding opposition to other candidacies. The key difference lies in the
threatening context provided by high levels of immigrants. That is, in
countries where immigration from Turkey is high, citizens are most hostile
to the Turkish candidacy. These results are also contrasted with those from
other candidate countries that have been the sources of large-scale immi-
gration, particularly Poland. The key conclusion drawn from the analysis is
that, although factors such as cultural threat may be important for explain-
ing hostility to Turkey’s candidacy, they are equally important for 
explaining hostility to other candidates and that the key problem for Turkey’s
candidacy is long-term, large-scale migration. Instead of creating a climate
of empathy for the country of origin of these migrants, high levels of Turkish
migration have created a climate of perceived threat to in-group resources
and culture that manifests itself partly as opposition to Turkey’s candidacy
for EU membership.
Explaining opposition to Turkey’s candidacy: Theoretical
perspectives
There are several strands of academic literature that help to explain why some
EU citizens are opposed to the idea of Turkey entering the EU while others
are more favourable. First is the general body of literature on public opinion
regarding government policies, as well as the general literature on voting
behaviour. Both of these tend to present at least two contrasting hypotheses
about the nature of opinion formation and political behaviour: the self-
interested approach and the group-interest, or sociotropic, approach. The
findings in these literatures indicate that at times self-interest motivates
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opinions, attitudes and behaviours whereas, at other times, more general
perceptions about the needs of society seem to be a motivation. Academic
literature on attitudes to the European integration process also incorporates
very similar themes. Moreover, as will be seen below, this paper conceives
opposition to Turkey’s EU candidacy as being strongly connected to feelings
about in-groups and out-groups, implying that literature on prejudice is
relevant as well. Not surprisingly, this literature also tends to contrast the role
of self-interest versus group-interest. The latter literature further points to the
importance of a threatening environment in explaining why some citizens are
more prejudiced than others. Each of these themes is outlined below and
applied to the context of the Turkish candidacy.
Rational economic self-interest
One of the key propositions in research on public opinion and mass political
behaviour is that these are based on individual self-interest: people have
differing feelings regarding public policies because those policies affect their
personal lives in different ways. This approach has already been applied in
a great number of studies of attitudes to European integration and should be
similarly applicable to the case of enlarging the EU to include Turkey.
In general terms, the rational egocentric argument found in the literature
on European integration is that EU citizens perceive European integration
through the lenses of how integration will affect them personally. Many of
these effects are said to be economic or financial, in that opponents of
integration are hostile to the project because it has caused them (or will cause
them) some financial harm. The economic policies adopted in the EU,
especially since the Single European Act, are argued to impose clear economic
costs and benefits on EU citizens: the free movement of labour and capital
provisions, as well as the increased possibility for business to move from one
to another of the EU member states, mean that companies can go freely to
where they find cheaper labour (and continue to benefit from EU-wide
business regulations) or cheaper labour can come to them, providing com-
petition for EU citizens who do certain types of work. Those with lower-level
job skills and at the lowest income levels are thought to be potentially most
hard-hit because they are more easily replaceable by companies moving else-
where or hiring migrant workers (see Anderson, 1998; Anderson and Reichert,
1996; Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Cichowski, 2000; Gabel, 1998a, 1998b; McLaren,
2006; Mahler et al., 2000; Markowski and Tucker, 2005; Slomczynski and
Shabad, 2003).
The same sort of competition pressures should apply if Turkey joins the
EU. Those who are already weakest in the EU market – those with low
incomes and who perform manual labour – should be the most fearful of
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Turkey joining the EU. It can be argued that, with Turkey as a full EU member,
businesses in current EU member states will be encouraged to move to that
country to seek lower costs in the form of cheaper wages.1 Moreover, EU
citizens are likely already to have the impression that poor, unskilled Turks
are willing to migrate to the EU to find work (given that so many have done
so – see Ahtisaari et al., 2004)2 and thus, once again, we would expect those
at the lowest income and job levels to be the most worried about the prospect
of Turkey joining the EU as a full member. In addition, it is expected that
farmers will be amongst the least supportive of the Turkish candidacy for
similar reasons: the Turkish agricultural sector is still relatively large, compris-
ing approximately 50% of all employment in the country and approximately
15% of GDP and exports (US State Department, 2005). Thus, concern about
competition for agricultural sales and subsidies with regard to Turkish entry
into the EU is likely to be particularly high amongst EU member state farmers.
Perceived threats to in-groups
Other research on public opinion and political behaviour indicates that public
perceptions of policy and citizen behaviour are not necessarily driven by the
rational self-interest described above (see Funk and Garcia-Monet, 1997;
Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Mansbridge, 1990; Sears and Funk, 1990). In some
cases, it is only when respondents are prompted to think about a particular
issue within the context of their own circumstances that personal self-interest
translates into support for or opposition to a policy (Chong et al., 2001; Sears
and Lau, 1983). This is likely also to be true in the case of perceptions of the
Turkish EU candidacy. Thus, with respondents having very little specific
information about the way that Turkey’s entry into the EU will affect them
personally – particularly their economic livelihoods – what would we expect
to serve as the basis of differing opinions regarding this candidate? I contend
that the main basis on which Turkey’s candidacy is perceived is in terms of
group interest. EU citizens may not have a clear idea of how this particular
enlargement will affect their own economic position but they are likely to have
some idea of how it will impact others like them, or their key in-groups. I
assume here that one of the key in-groups is the nation or nationality,
although I acknowledge that studying perceptions of other in-groups may be
equally applicable.3
There are several reasons for turning to perceptions of the effects of
policies on the in-group. First, research on economics and elections has long
illustrated the importance of group-level concerns. In models that include
pocketbook and sociotropic economic indicators (the former consisting of
measures of concern about one’s personal economic situation and the latter
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measuring feelings about the national economy), it is the latter that appear
to predict voting behaviour most consistently (Kinder, 1981; Kinder and
Kiewiet, 1979; Lewis-Beck, 1988). That is, choices between government
officials appear to be far more consistently driven by perceptions about how
candidates will influence the economic prospects of the country as a whole,
with personal pocketbook considerations often playing a minimal or non-
existent role. In this case, it may be that individuals have difficulty determin-
ing how an election outcome will affect their own pocketbooks and instead
turn to an analysis of the election’s impact on their fellow citizens. Similarly,
research on attitudes to the welfare state and healthcare policy in Europe indi-
cates that these attitudes tend to be driven far more by sociotropic concerns
than by individual-level self-interest (Gelissen, 2000; Gevers et al., 2000). A
similar process is likely to occur in the context of contemplating the Turkish
candidacy: EU citizens may not be clear about how this candidacy will affect
their pocketbooks, and so they consider the candidacy in terms of its impact
on their fellow citizens instead.
Second, Turkey is not likely to be seen simply as a holistic, organic nation-
state and global politics player. In contrast to the way that many EU officials
might treat the country – in terms of its level of democracy, economic develop-
ment, etc. – EU citizens are likely to see it also in terms of the people who
constitute the country (i.e. Turks). Perceiving EU enlargement not just in the
context of the country that will be adopted into the EU but also in terms of
the new citizens who will join the EU renders an in-group focus even more
relevant. This is because rejection of the Turkish candidacy may be more about
rejection of Turks as a group of people than about rejection of the country in
abstract terms.
Conceptualizing enlargement in this way means that explanations for
differences in opinion about the Turkish candidacy are likely to relate to out-
group rejection and its counterpart, in-group identity and protectiveness. The
social psychology literature points to at least two different aspects of pro-
tectiveness: those connected to the group’s resources and those related to
important symbols, customs and myths that the group holds to be import-
ant. What threats do Turks and Turkey pose to these group elements, though?
If Turkey is perceived as consisting of Turks, the prospect of enlargement
presents a very similar dilemma to that of immigration from Turkey – a point
also mentioned in the above discussion of rational economic self-interest –
and so the threats to the in-group presented by Turks should be similar to
perceived threats presented by immigrants and other minorities in general.
Specifically, immigrants and minorities are often seen as posing a threat to
the jobs of natives or non-minorities and to the social security resources of
the host country (see Citrin et al., 1997; Bobo, 1988; LeVine and Campbell,
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1972; Quillian, 1995). Moreover, such perceptions often exist regardless of the
degree of personal vulnerability to job loss or dependence on social security
benefits (see Citrin et al., 1997). Given that modern Turkey is a country of
emigration that has traditionally sent its poorer citizens to work in EU
member states (as discussed above), it would seem very likely that EU citizens
perceive this candidacy as a strong potential threat to group resources such
as social security benefits and jobs.
It is not just the threat to resources presented by Turks that should affect
feelings about the Turkish candidacy; threats to culture and way of life (some-
times termed ‘symbols’ in social psychology literature) are likely to be par-
ticularly strong in the Turkish case (see Ivarsflaten, 2005; Sears et al., 1979;
Sniderman et al., 2004). In addition to the possible problem of being perceived
as traditional and/or backward, Turkey faces the obvious potential difficulty
of being predominantly Muslim. Because of these perceived differences
between Turkish and European cultures, feelings about this particular candi-
date may be strongly connected to concerns about the maintenance of the
culture and way of life of key in-groups. Furthermore, if – as some contend
(see Müftüler-Baç 2000) – feelings about Turkey’s candidacy are pre-
dominantly motivated by fears related to culture and religion, we would
expect these fears to be far stronger in predicting attitudes to Turkey’s
candidacy vis-à-vis attitudes to other candidacies.
Context
As shown in the introduction, opposition to Turkey’s candidacy is con-
sistently higher than opposition to any other pre-2004 candidacy. Moreover,
the level of opposition varies considerably by EU member state. Although it
is entirely possible that the individual-level explanations discussed above
account for both of these phenomena, it seems more likely that contextual
explanations must be introduced. Because of the large differences across EU
member states in levels of opposition to Turkey’s candidacy, I assume in this
article that the country-level context is relevant. Which aspects of context are
important for explaining feelings about Turkey’s candidacy, though?
One potential contextual explanation stems from the economic self-
interest and group-interest approaches. Namely, attitudes to European
integration and attitudes to EU enlargement have both been conceived as
being connected to the trade benefits received from the process of European
integration (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Jones and van der Bijl, 2004). 
As applied to the Turkish candidacy, EU member states do not receive 
much in the way of trade benefits from Turkey, and so citizens are generally
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more strongly opposed to this country’s candidacy than to other EU
candidacies.
Other potential contextual variables include the degree of poverty of the
candidate country. Also in line with the economic interest approach, it may
be argued that citizens of EU member states should be more hostile to the
poorer of the EU candidates because their addition to the EU will very likely
mean increased financial support – in turn implying that EU citizens them-
selves will be forced to subsidize the new member state economies. However,
analyses by Karp and Bowler (2006) indicate that a candidate’s GDP per capita
has little impact on support for or opposition to that particular candidacy (see
also Jones and van der Bijl, 2004).
Another contextual argument in literature on attitudes to enlargement
revolves around the notion of geographical proximity. Jones and van der Bijl
(2004) contend that greater geographical proximity promotes a stronger 
‘we-feeling’ between the candidate and the member state. Thus, the greater
the geographical proximity, the greater the support for a candidate country.
Besides these contextual factors, I contend that, given the potential for
cultural and resource-based threats discussed above, the context presented
by Turkish migration may explain the relatively large degree of hostility to this
particular candidate. In contrast to other candidate countries, Turkey has been
a major source of large-scale migration to Europe since the end of the Second
World War, with the highest concentrations of Turks residing in Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium (Ahtisaari et al., 2004; see also
Castles et al., 1984). Although such migration might actually provide a source
of sympathy or empathy for the Turkish candidacy as citizens of member
states become more familiar with and connected to individuals from this
group, this would require that EU citizens have had intimate contact with
this group of migrants (e.g. in the form of friendships – see Jackman and
Crane, 1986; Pettigrew, 1998; Wagner and Zick, 1995). In fact, most analyses
of the relationship between high concentrations of immigrants or minorities
and hostility to those groups indicates that the former is usually associated
with hostility rather than with positive feelings or behaviours (Bobo, 1988;
Giles and Hertz, 1994; Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000; Quillian, 1995; Taylor,
1998; Valenty and Sylvia, 2004). It is hypothesized that such hostility is likely
to carry over into feelings about whether a country ought to be able to join
the European Union, and that higher concentrations of Turkish migrants in a
member state will mean individuals in that member state have a lower
probability of supporting Turkey’s candidacy.
It is possible, however, that the threat posed by migration from Turkey
is also non-linear and functions through the perceived threats discussed
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above. Cross-level interactions are therefore investigated, with the following
expectations:
• The combination of high levels of feelings of threat to group resources
and high levels of Turkish migration will make EU citizens significantly
more likely to oppose the Turkish candidacy.
• The combination of high levels of feelings of threat to group way of life
and high levels of Turkish migration will make EU citizens significantly
more likely to oppose the Turkish candidacy.
Empirical analysis
Data and methods
The statistical analysis proceeds as follows. I shall analyse each of the
theoretical propositions presented above empirically in turn. In addition to
the analysis of attitudes toward the Turkish candidacy, the study provides a
comparison of these results with those for the Central and East European
(CEE) candidates as well as Malta and Cyprus. In the absence of such an
analysis, it would be unclear whether the findings presented here are unique
to attitudes to Turkey or whether they also explain differences in opinion
regarding other candidates. I thus base the empirical analyses on a somewhat
less recent Eurobarometer, namely Eurobarometer (EB) 53 from spring 2000.
Note also that I chose this particular survey because it contains measures of
the theoretical propositions related to in-group protectiveness discussed
above.4 However, these analyses fail to provide a completely adequate expla-
nation of the potential uniqueness of the Turkish case; that is, the individual-
level explanations cannot account for the higher overall levels of opposition
to the Turkish candidacy or for variation across countries in terms of oppo-
sition (see below). For this reason, I will look to the country level to improve
the explanation of differences in opinion regarding Turkey’s candidacy.5
Given that the results are pooled across EU member states6 and con-
textual variables are introduced, some corrective measures are necessary to
account for the potential non-uniqueness of observations within countries.
Thus, I use multi-level modelling techniques to correct for potentially biased
standard errors and eventually to estimate the impact of context on attitudes
to Turkey’s candidacy. The reasons for using these particular techniques are
now well explained in the literature on cross-national opinion formation (see
Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Rohrschneider, 2002; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002;
see also Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, or Snijders and Bosker, 1999, for more
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general explanations of multi-level modelling techniques), but, very briefly,
the potential for non-uniqueness may lead to the commitment of a Type I error
(that is, rejecting the null hypothesis when the null is, in fact, true). Multi-level
modelling techniques help to avoid this problem by re-computing standard
errors based on the intra-class correlation (rho)7 and the numbers of obser-
vations at different levels (e.g. individual and country levels). Because it is
entirely possible that there is no significant clustering at the country level, it
is important first to determine what the intra-class correlation is. Unfortu-
nately, the response choices on the dependent variable in the current analysis
are limited to ‘in favour’, ‘oppose’ and ‘don’t know’, so standard variance
components measures normally available for interval-scaled variables are
inappropriate for this particular dependent variable. However, if the variable
is converted into dichotomies and proportions across countries fitting into each
category are compared, we may use ANOVA techniques to calculate rho. Ulti-
mately, multinomial logistic regression is used to estimate the effects of
independent variables on opposition to the Turkish candidacy, so I conduct
the ANOVA in such a way that the dependent variable is as close as possible
to the multinomial logistic regression scenario.
Table 3 provides the analysis of variance statistics for these categories of
the dependent variable. Although the rho values are fairly small (e.g. only
5.6% of the individual-level variation in opposition to Turkish membership
vis-à-vis support for Turkish membership can be accounted for by the cross-
national variation in this variable), this coefficient is statistically significant
and has a non-trivial impact on the effective number of observations.8 Thus,
incorporating multi-level modelling techniques is clearly necessary.
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Table 3 Opposition to Turkish EU membership: Analysis of variance
Sum of squares Rho
Oppose Turkish candidacy
Between groups 157.48
Within groups 2625.53 .056**
Total 2783.01
Uncertain about Turkish candidacy
Between groups 56.93
Within groups 1834.61 .030**
Total 1891.54
Notes: Both groups are compared with the omitted category, ‘in favour’ of Turkey joining the EU.
Rho is the between-groups sum of squares divided by the total sum of squares.
** significant at the p ≤ .001 level.
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Rational economic self-interest
The specific hypotheses that follow from the above discussion of rational
self-interest and opposition to the Turkish candidacy are that those doing
manual labour, those who are farmers, those who are unemployed, and those
at the lowest level of incomes ought to be less likely to support Turkey’s EU
candidacy than individuals in other occupation and income categories
(Questions D15 and D29 in EB 53). Model 1 of Table 4 provides estimates of
these effects based on a multinomial logistic regression analysis conducted
using HLM software (recall that the dependent variable has three categories:
support, oppose and don’t know). Although the numbers of respondents in
the ‘don’t know’ category is non-trivial and may deserve further investi-
gation, I focus here on the comparison between the ‘in favour’ and ‘against’
categories of the dependent variable, because the theories outlined above are
devoted to explaining differences between these two groups. It is important
to note that the analysis presented here is motivated by Achen’s (2002)
admonition against the ‘kitchen sink’ approach to model estimation; as
argued by Achen, introducing too many control variables generally means
that we are unable to adequately determine what is going on in a data set.
Thus, for the purposes of this study, I will initially investigate the effects of
key independent variables and then move to a multivariate analysis 
that includes the three key sets of independent variables discussed above
(i.e. rational economic self-interest, threat to group resources, and threat to
group culture and way of life).
Model 1 of Table 4 indicates that, even in a simple analysis that includes
only measures of rational self-interest, these indicators do not achieve the
basic minimum of statistical significance at the p ≤ .05 level. Thus, in stark
contrast to the expectations based on this approach, job status and income
appear to have little bearing on hostility to Turkey’s EU candidacy. Is this
finding unique to the Turkish candidacy, however? Table 5 indicates that it
may be: for each of the other pre-2004 candidates, at least one of the measures
of rational self-interest achieves minimal statistical significance and, in almost
every case, EU15 citizens at the lowest level of income are more likely to
express hostility to the CEE candidates as well as to Cyprus and Malta.
Moreover, the odds ratios indicate that the effects are substantively non-trivial
in many cases. For instance, the odds of farmers in the EU15 opposing many
of the candidacies (specifically the Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Slovenian,
Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Bulgarian and Cypriot candidacies) is approxi-
mately 1.5 higher than the odds of their supporting these candidacies; the
odds ratio for Malta is even larger, at 1.86. Also, the odds ratio of those at the
lowest levels of income in the EU15 opposing the Czech, Slovak, Polish,
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Hungarian and Maltese candidacies is 1.25 to 1.40 times that of not opposing.
In sum, although economic self-interest may help us to distinguish between
supporters and opponents of other candidates, it does not go far in explain-
ing the opposition to Turkey’s candidacy.
Threats to group resources
One of my key contentions in this paper is that opposition to Turkey’s EU
candidacy is likely to stem from worry about the effect of the country and its
citizens on the general resources of at least one key in-group, the nation-state.
This section utilizes an index consisting of the following three items to in-
vestigate the viability of this argument:
• ‘In schools where there are too many children from these minority
groups, the quality of education suffers (tend to agree, tend to disagree,
don’t know).’ (Q51.1)
• ‘People from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits
(tend to agree, tend to disagree, don’t know).’ (Q51.3)
• ‘The presence of people from these minority groups increases unemploy-
ment in [COUNTRY] (tend to agree, tend to disagree, don’t know).’
(Q51.15)
‘These minority groups’ in this group of items refers to a previous survey
question in which respondents were asked whether they feel themselves to
belong to one of the minority groups in the country, in terms of race, religion
and culture. Research indicates that, since the Second World War, respondents
are generally referring to migrants when answering these questions (see
McLaren, 2002).
These three items were chosen for their face value – they appear to tap
into feelings about various resources that might be perceived as belonging to
a key in-group, such as jobs, social welfare benefits and education benefits.
Some may contend that these items actually capture fears of threat to one’s
own resources rather than to those of a larger in-group. Previous analyses by
me (see, for instance, McLaren, 2006) indicate that this is highly unlikely, and
that the above items do not, in fact, appear to be a reflection of personal 
self-interest.
Model 2 of Table 4 provides the multinomial logistic regression co-
efficients for the relationship between perceptions of threat to group resources
and opposition to Turkey’s candidacy. The results indicate that these per-
ceptions are statistically significant predictors of such opposition. According
to the odds ratio, a one unit increase in the index of threat to group resources
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(which ranges from 0 to 6) is associated with a 1.21 increase in the odds of
opposing the Turkish candidacy. Clearly the impact is non-trivial as well as
statistically significant.
Once again, we turn to the question of whether this explanation is
unique to the Turkish candidacy. Does threat to the resources of the nation
explain a particular fear of the Turkish candidacy or is it possible that feelings
about other candidates are affected by such fears as well? Table 6 provides
estimates of these effects and indicates that they have a very similar impact
on opposition to all of the pre-2004 candidates. Thus, fears of threats to the
nation-state’s resources translate into opposition to the Turkish candidacy
but also into opposition to any of these candidates (most of which have since
joined the EU). Thus, we are still left with the question of whether there is
any aspect to opposition to Turkey’s candidacy that is unique to that particu-
lar candidate.
Threats to culture and way of life
Amongst the theories outlined above, threats to culture and way of life would
be most likely to apply more exclusively to the Turkish case. As discussed
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Table 6 Effect of perceived threats on opposition to other candidates
Threat to group symbols, 
Threat to group resources way of life, etc.
—————————————— ——————————–———
b SE OR b SE OR
Czech Rep. 0.24 0.02 1.27*** 0.29 0.02 1.34***
Slovakia 0.23 0.02 1.26*** 0.28 0.02 1.62***
Poland 0.22 0.02 1.25*** 0.27 0.02 1.25***
Hungary 0.22 0.02 1.24*** 0.28 0.02 1.32***
Romania 0.21 0.02 1.24*** 0.24 0.02 1.27***
Slovenia 0.22 0.02 1.25*** 0.26 0.02 1.29***
Estonia 0.21 0.02 1.24*** 0.23 0.02 1.26***
Latvia 0.20 0.02 1.23*** 0.23 0.02 1.25***
Lithuania 0.20 0.02 1.23*** 0.22 0.02 1.25***
Bulgaria 0.23 0.02 1.25*** 0.25 0.02 1.25***
Cyprus 0.20 0.02 1.27*** 0.24 0.02 1.27***
Malta 0.20 0.02 1.22*** 0.25 0.02 1.28***
Notes: N Level 1 = 14,575, N Level 2 = 15. Coefficients are multinomial logistic regression
coefficients for the against/in favour pair of responses on the dependent variable; OR are the odds
ratios. All coefficients and standard errors were computed using HLM. 
*** p ≤ .001.
above, the key factor that distinguishes Turkey culturally is its religious 
roots, along with perceptions of backwardness or non-Europeanness with
which these may be associated. That is, assumptions about the treatment of
women and about the differences between European and Muslim culture
generally would imply that perceived threats to culture and way of life 
predict opposition to Turkey’s candidacy at much higher levels than they pre-
dict opposition to other candidates. An index including the following three
items was used to gauge general feelings of threat to culture:
• ‘People from these minority groups are enriching the cultural life of
[COUNTRY] (tend to agree, tend to disagree, don’t know; coding
reversed prior to index construction).’ (Q51.6)
• ‘The religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten
our way of life (tend to agree, tend to disagree, don’t know).’ (Q51.7)
• ‘People belonging to these minority groups are so different, they can
never be fully accepted members of [NATIONALITY] society (tend to
agree, tend to disagree, don’t know).’ (Q59.11)
Again, these items were chosen for their face value. It must be noted that I
am not contending that the sorts of threat measured by these three items are
completely unrelated to perceived threats to group resources. That is, in-
dividuals who feel that there are threats to resources may also feel that
minority groups pose threats to other, more symbolic aspects of in-group life.
Indeed, the two constructs are correlated (Pearson’s r = .45). However, I do
contend that there is a theoretical distinction to be made, and indeed, as
shown in Model 5 of Table 4, each construct also makes a unique contribution
to understanding opposition to the Turkish candidacy.
Model 3 of Table 4 provides the multinomial logistic regression coefficient
for the relationship between threats to culture and opposition to Turkey’s EU
membership. The size of the effect indicates that it has a very similar impact
to that of perceived threat to group resources (the range of this scale is
identical to the previous one, 0–6).
Is the impact of this variable different when other candidates are
considered? Table 6 indicates that fears of changes to national culture and
way of life are associated with opposition to all of the pre-2004 candidates:
fears stemming from a loss of culture clearly affect levels of hostility to
Turkey’s candidacy, but no more than they affect hostility to the other candi-
dacies. Thus, the higher overall levels of opposition to Turkey’s candidacy
cannot be explained by individual-level perceptions of threat to culture and
way of life.
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The impact of context
The findings thus far create an intriguing puzzle. If rational self-interest,
threats to group resources and threats to culture and way of life do not
provide a complete explanation for the relatively high level of hostility to
Turkey’s candidacy vis-à-vis other candidates, then it seems likely that the
explanation for much of this hostility will lie in contextual-level variables. I
discussed multiple potential contextual explanations in the theoretical section
of this article. However, because of the very limited degrees of freedom at the
level of country context (at the time of the survey used in this analysis, there
were only 15 EU member states), these contending country-level explanations
cannot all be entered into the analyses simultaneously.
Fortunately, it is possible to rule out many of these contending expla-
nations for differences in levels of opposition to Turkey’s candidacy. First,
other empirical analyses have already pointed to the conclusion that the level
of a candidate’s economic development plays little or no role in explaining
differing feelings about that candidate (Jones and van der Bijl, 2004; Karp and
Bowler, 2006). Second, a simple scatterplot between levels of trade with
Turkey and feelings about the Turkish candidacy indicates that this variable
is not relevant when it comes to this particular candidacy.9 Finally, it seems
highly unlikely that geographical proximity is positively connected with a
‘we-feeling’ when it comes to Turkey’s candidacy. Greece is Turkey’s immedi-
ate neighbour and is traditionally one of the country’s strongest opponents;
Austria and Germany are also amongst the closest EU countries to Turkey
and their citizens are amongst the most hostile to the country’s candidacy. On
the other hand, the more distant EU member states such as the UK and Spain
have citizens who are the least hostile to Turkey’s candidacy (see Table 2
above). A simple scatterplot and regression analysis confirms that, if
anything, the relationship between proximity and opposition to the Turkish
candidacy is indeed the opposite of that predicted by Jones and van der Bijl
(2004).
The final contextual hypothesis posited above was that a high level of
concentration of Turkish migrants was likely to contribute to overall negative
feelings about this particular candidacy. This hypothesis has two empirical
implications: first, where the number of Turkish migrants is higher, the level
of opposition to this candidacy will be higher; second, opposition to Turkey’s
candidacy across the EU (i.e. the EU average level of opposition) is higher
because of the greater experience with Turks compared with immigrants from
other candidate countries.
Figure 1 indicates that this contextual hypothesis generally receives
empirical support. Even with the outliers – Germany and Austria – removed
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Figure 1 Migration and opposition to Turkey’s EU candidacy.
Note: Migration measured using Eurostat’s European Social Statistics: Migration, 2000 edition.
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from the scatterplot, the relationship remains positive and relatively strong
(compare Figures 1a and 1b).10 This is in stark contrast to the other candi-
dacies; for some of these (particularly Poland, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia), although the relationship between migration and opposition to the
candidacy is positive, the effect is weak and negative when Germany and
Austria are omitted from the analysis.11
Figure 2 provides plots for the candidate for which the relationship was
strongest, i.e. Poland. In addition to the fact that the effect of Polish 
migration is altered once Germany and Austria are omitted (whereas this was
not the case for the Turkish candidacy), the generally smaller overall numbers
of Polish migrants in relation to Turkish migrants should be noted (compare
across the horizontal axes). It thus appears that high levels of Turkish
migrants in several of the EU member states have created an atmosphere in
which citizens of those countries are generally more negative about this candi-
dacy than would be the case if the member state had not experienced 
migration from Turkey.
Models 4 and 5 of Table 4 also test for cross-level interactions, and the
results indicate that the effect of migration may indeed be interactive. Figure
3 illustrates the effects of these interactions for Model 4, the model that
includes group threat to resources. The interactive relationship between threat
to culture and Turkish migration is very similar to that shown in Figure 3.
Clearly both types of perceived threat affect the likelihood of opposing the
Turkish candidacy but, when the level of migration from Turkey is high,
general opposition to this candidacy is higher and increases even further
when the perceived threat increases. The probability of opposing Turkey’s
candidacy is actually fairly low at low levels of perceived threat and when
migration from Turkey is low to medium (the dashed lines in Figure 3);
however, the probability of opposing the candidacy approaches .75 when the
threat is high and when there are large numbers of Turkish migrants in the
member state (the solid line in Figure 3). Again, a similar interactive effect
could be detected in the case of Polish migration and the Polish candidacy;
however, the predicted probability of opposing Poland’s candidacy is far
lower than the predicted probability of opposing Turkey’s candidacy, and this
appears to be related to the much smaller number of Polish migrants living
in the EU15 member states. Thus, it seems that experience with Turkish
migration, along with the high degrees of threat that may be associated with
it, have made EU citizens more hostile to this candidate than to any other.
The implication is that, if other candidates had been the source of such large-
scale migration into the EU, EU citizens might have been equally hostile to
these candidates.
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Figure 2 Migration and opposition to Poland’s EU candidacy.
Conclusion
I have presented opposition to Turkey’s European Union candidacy in terms
of two key themes: rational economic self-interest and perceived threat to
group resources and way of life. The findings indicate that, whereas oppo-
sition to other candidacies may be connected to economic self-interest, in that
those doing certain types of work and at lower income levels are more likely
to oppose other candidacies, this does not appear to be the case for Turkey’s
candidacy. That is, those at varying income levels and occupations are equally
European Union Politics 8(2)2 7 2
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Figure 3 Interactive effect of perceived threat to group resources and Turkish
migration.
Note: The three lines represent different levels of the population that are Turkish migrants,
measured as a percentage of the total population of the EU member state. They are low, medium
and high levels, defined as the countries in the 10th percentile, at the median, and in the 90th
percentile, respectively. The percentages appear small compared with what might be expected,
but they represent only documented migrants, not naturalized citizens or illegal immigrants.
opposed to the Turkish candidacy, and so rational economic self-interest does
not go very far in helping to explain this opposition.
I then examined other potential threats posed by Turkey’s EU candidacy.
I argued that, because Turkey may be viewed in terms of its citizenry and the
potential impact of this citizenry on the EU and its member states, theories
of out-group hostility should be introduced. The first of these theories had to
do with threats to group-level resources: although EU candidacies such as
Turkey’s may not necessarily be viewed in terms of personal economic losses,
EU citizens may consider the potential losses to others like them, or their key
in-groups. Similarly, I argued that the prospect of the Turkish candidacy
might stimulate concerns that were less economic in nature and more
‘symbolic’ – i.e. threats to culture, way of life, and important symbols and
values that the in-group holds to be dear.
In fact, the findings indicate that individual-level feelings of threat to
group resources and culture are associated with a greater likelihood of
opposing Turkey’s candidacy, but they are also associated with a higher
probability of opposing other pre-2004 candidates as well. That is, despite
expectations to the contrary, high levels of perceived threat are not par-
ticularly associated with feelings about Turkey.
In order to further examine the potential for uniqueness of the Turkish
case, I introduced the role of context. Economic interests in terms of trade with
Turkey and other candidates appear to play very little role in predicting atti-
tudes to this candidacy. On the other hand, the evidence presented indicates
that experience with migration from Turkey may be a key contextual expla-
nation for hostility to this candidacy. Instead of creating a ‘we-feeling’ and
empathy for the Turkish candidacy, such migration appears to be having
counterproductive effects. Two tentative implications are that (1) if the country
had not been such a major sending country to the EU, opposition amongst EU
citizens might not be so high, and (2) if the other candidates had been sources
of such large-scale migration, opposition to those candidacies could have been
far higher than it was.
Ultimately, the decision on a Turkish enlargement of the EU is the
responsibility of EU member state leaders. However, it seems highly unlikely
that these leaders will agree to admit Turkey in the face of large-scale mass
opposition. Moreover, citizens in many of the member states are demanding
a referendum on the issue and if a referendum is held in a country such as
France it appears very unlikely that citizens will vote in favour of Turkey’s
entry into the EU. This paper has provided some tools with which govern-
ment leaders may try to alter citizen opinion on this issue. Clearly, citizens
are most worried about the potential effects of Turkish entry on the economic
and social welfare benefits of their fellow citizens and on national culture and
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way of life, as they were with other candidates. The difference, however, is
that large-scale migration from Turkey may have created an environment in
which these fears are amplified to a much greater extent than was the case
with the 2004 enlargement candidates. If government leaders are going to
successfully enlarge the EU to include this prospective member state, particu-
larly given the degree of experience with Turkish migration, they will need
to adopt measures to allay such fears, perhaps including provision for a
waiting period on the free movement of labour provision similar to that
adopted in the 2004 enlargement. Turkish leaders are likely to strongly oppose
such measures, but the findings presented here indicate that they must recog-
nize that their citizens are perceived as threatening and that the EU may need
some time to adjust to having the country as a full EU member state.
Notes
I wish to thank three EUP reviewers for providing extremely helpful comments
on earlier versions of this paper. Any errors are, of course, my sole responsibility.
1 For instance, the average monthly private sector wage in Turkey in 1999 was
approximately €500 (see http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/oiea/
wagestudy/FS-Turkey.htm, consulted 12 June 2006) whereas the average
German monthly wage in 1999 was €2340, with the eastern part of 
Germany still having an average wage of €1728 (see http://www.destatis.de/
indicators/e/lrver03ae.htm, consulted 12 June 2006).
2 Although the earliest post-war migrants tended to be relatively skilled and
educated and from the more developed regions vis-à-vis the average popu-
lation in Turkey, in the second half of the 1960s recruitment switched to less
skilled rural workers (see Gökdere, 1978).
3 The choice of nation as the key in-group here is in great part related to the
paucity of data concerning feelings of protectiveness of other levels of in-
groups (particularly in surveys that also measure attitudes to EU enlarge-
ment). However, data from the 1995 International Social Survey Programme
and Eurobarometer surveys indicate that the focus on the nation as a key in-
group is not unreasonable: national pride in things such as the way democ-
racy works in the country, scientific achievements, sports, the arts and history
is generally high in Europe, and approximately 90% of EU citizens claim to
feel attached to their country (see, for instance, Eurobarometer 54.1 for the
latter statistics).
4 Namely, the items listed in the sections on ‘Threat to Group Resources’ and
‘Threat to Symbols, Culture, Way of Life’ are available in only a handful of
Eurobarometer polls (and cross-national polls about enlargement generally
appear only in the Eurobarometer series). The most recent of these that
includes questions about threats from minorities is EB 59.2 from spring 2003,
but this poll does not include items measuring threat to group resources nor
does it include items about enlargement.
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5 I focus upon the country-level context because of the considerable cross-
national differences in opposition to Turkey’s candidacy illustrated in Table 2.
Moreover, immigration policies are determined by national governments, 
and so it is assumed that country-level immigration sets the tone of debate
regarding immigration. Other contexts, such as neighbourhood, could also
be analysed, except for the paucity of comparable data across EU member
states.
6 The member states in the EU at the time of the survey used here were: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
7 Rho can be thought of as the proportion of variance in a variable that can 
be attributed to the units on which the sample is based (e.g. country); it is
the variance at this level divided by the total variance in the variable (see
Goldstein, 1987).
8 If we assume a sample size of 1000 across 15 countries with a rho value of
5.6, the effective number of observations for the ‘oppose Turkish candidacy’/
‘support Turkish candidacy’ variable is less than 300. Also note that, if the
variables were dichotomized such that, for the oppose variable, against = 1
and all else = 0, and, for the don’t know variable, don’t know = 1 and all
else = 0, rho values are very similar to those reported here (0.060 and 0.034,
respectively).
9 All plots and analyses not presented here can be found on the EUP website.
See http://www.uni-konstanz.de/eup/issues.htm.
10 When using multi-level modelling techniques, the effect of migration from
Turkey on hostility to the Turkish candidacy is statistically significant as well.
11 The full range of scatterplots is available on the EUP website.
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